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ABSTRACT
Developing Optimization Techniques for Logistical Tendering Using Reverse
Combinatorial Auctions
by
Jennifer Kiser
In business-to-business logistical sourcing events, companies regularly use a bidding
process known as tendering in the procurement of transportation services from third-
party providers. Usually in the form of an auction involving a single buyer and one or
more sellers, the buyer must make decisions regarding with which suppliers to partner
and how to distribute the transportation lanes and volume among its suppliers; this is
equivalent to solving the optimization problem commonly referred to as the Winner
Determination Problem. In order to take into account the complexities inherent
to the procurement problem, such as considering a suppliers network, economies of
scope, and the inclusion of business rules and preferences on the behalf of the buyer,
we present the development of a mixed-integer linear program to model the reverse
combinatorial auction for logistical tenders.
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1 MOTIVATION
Companies regularly use tendering in the procurement of transportation services
from third-party providers, usually in the form of an auction. Common types of
auctions include forward auctions, reverse auctions, combinatorial auctions, and con-
ditional (also referred to as expressive) auctions [24]. A traditional (forward) auction,
simply referred to as an auction, is from the perspective of the seller where the high-
est bidder is the winner, while a reverse auction is from the perspective of the buyer
where the lowest bidder is the winner [13]. In each of these types of auctions, bids are
limited to single items. Combinatorial auctions allow bids to be placed on bundles,
packages, or sets of items [30]. Similarly, reverse combinatorial auctions allow bids to
be placed on one or more items and are from the perspective of the buyer.
The company that purchases the services is referred to as the buyer or shipper,
and the corresponding company that provides the desired services is referred to as the
supplier or carrier. Partnerships, and ultimately contracts, between the buyer and
supplier are established through a bidding process, otherwise referred to as a tender.
Buyers forecast expected demand on individual lanes, where a lane is defined to be
a shipping route consisting of an origin and a destination. The buyer bids out the
lanes for which it requires service, along with the estimated volume of the lane. The
shipper responds with a quoted price for which it will service either an individual
lane or a set of lanes in the form of a bid. By placing a bid, the carrier agrees to
service that lane at the quoted price and enters into a contract with the buyer. Once
the buyer receives bids from all potential carriers, the buyer evaluates all of the bids
on each lane and chooses the winner, usually awarding an individual lane or a set of
11
lanes to the lowest bidder.
Often the buyer will assign carriers to lanes based on other characteristics and
constraints in addition to cost. Optimization problem solved by the buyer is an con-
venient and practical approach. The buyer matches carriers to the lanes it is best
able to serve. This in turn reduces costs across the supply chain [7]. The optimiza-
tion problem consists of minimizing total transportation cost subject to one or more
constraints. For instance, the constraints may ensure that each lane is awarded to at
most one carrier, the volume awarded on each lane does not exceed the expected de-
mand, or the number of lanes awarded to a given carrier does not exceed the volume
the carrier is willing to supply [4, 19, 33].
Operations research is a branch of mathematics that studies constrained opti-
mization. A buyer can define an optimization problem in the form of a cost function
subject to constraints. This allows the buyer to consider several factors in addition to
the price of a bid when determining how to assign carriers to lanes. Each of the con-
straints to which the cost function is subject, along with any additional constraints
that represent the buyer’s business rules and/or preferences, are formalized mathe-
matically. The cost function, which represents the total cost of its transportation
services in the form of a sum of submitted bids, is minimized subject to all of the
business constraints. The mathematical techniques used in operations research to
solve the optimization problem provide the buyer with the optimal allocation.
The goal of this work is to present a comprehensive and cohesive outline of not
only the formulation, but also the implementation of an optimization problem which
to use in commercial logistical tendering. We proceed by presenting an introduction
12
to tendering optimization and outline several aspects of the supply chain in chapter 2.
We also include specific instances for which a business may find the use of optimization
techniques both desirable and effective during the logistics procurement process. We
proceed to present an overview of linear programming along with the combinatorial
auction optimization models in chapter 3, while chapter 4 consists of an introduction
to stochastic programming and the stochastic linear programming models. All of the
methods and implementation details of the models are found in chapter 5, the results
are presented in chapter 6, and lastly, our future work and conclusions can be found
in chapter 7.
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2 TENDERING OPTIMIZATION
In order to formalize the outlined optimization problem, it is important to outline
several aspects of the supply chain pertaining to transportation procurement. This
chapter consists of delineating logistics and sourcing as it relates to the supply chain,
the tendering methodology pertaining to a firm’s transportation needs, and how lo-
gistics pertains to economies of scope in sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, respectively. The
resulting allocation problem is described in section 2.4, followed by detailed examples
in section 2.5 as further motivation for the need to apply operations research tech-
niques to formally define the tendering optimization problem. Lastly, we conclude
the chapter with a discussion on the role of electronic auctions in the procurement of
logistical services and its use in solving the outlined allocation problem.
2.1 Introduction to Logistics and Sourcing
Logistics is regarded as the portion of the supply chain that deals with the orga-
nization and management of the transportation of goods and services [5]. The most
common modes of transportation services utilized by businesses include air, freight
or rail, water, road via truckload (TL) or less-than-truckload (LTL), pipeline, and
intermodal [35]. Intermodal transportation services consist of any combination of
two or more of the aforementioned services, such as the use of truckload or less-than
truckload in conjunction with freight services where the trucking service acts as an
intermediary in order to transport goods, perhaps from a warehouse or distribution
center to a loading dock.
Because each transportation mode consists of unique trade-offs between cost and
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lead time, individual business needs must be considered when making logistical deci-
sions, such as choosing a mode of transportation. A company may employ different
modes of transportation for different products depending on the size and value of
the product it needs shipped. The design and implementation of a company’s sup-
ply chain further impacts the decisions involved in choosing transportation services.
Depending on the use and proximity of warehouses and distribution centers, certain
modes of transportation may be more cost efficient, maintain adequate inventory
levels, and produce desired customer responsiveness levels [5].
In addition to choosing an adequate mode of transportation, a company must
decide to either manage their own transportation services in-house or to outsource
these services. Businesses that invest in establishing and managing their own trans-
portation needs are commonly referred to as 4PL, while those businesses that procure
transportation services from a third party logistics provider are referred to as 3PL
[35]. In these types of business-to-business (B2B) transactions, the business that is
purchasing or sourcing the transportation services is commonly referred to as the
shipper or buyer, and the 3PLs that provide transportation services are commonly
referred to as the carriers or suppliers.
A third party provider should provide a company with the benefits of combining
lower costs with higher quality service than what the company could provide on its
own. Additional benefits gained by outsourcing logistical services include being able
to focus on the business’s main strengths and core competencies, improvements in
customer service, and decreases in labor problems due to the transfer of responsibil-
ity to the third party provider [10]. However, involving a third party also brings risk
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associated with it, such as shifting power from one enterprise to another or underes-
timating the costs (either monetary, time, or reputation costs) incurred in organizing
and managing numerous outside firms [5]. The decision to outsource services through
a 3PL should not solely be based on an increase in savings across the supply chain but
should also take into account the risks involved when a third party entity is involved.
In todays global market, businesses often make the decision to procure or obtain
transportation services from a third party logistics provider. In the United States
alone, logistics and transportation spending in 2015 made up 8 percent of the coun-
try’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) by totaling $1.48 trillion [36].
2.2 The Procurement and Tendering Process
In general when a firm makes the decision to outsource its transportation services,
the company is faced with numerous decisions. The buyer must decide with which
supplier to partner and how to allocate the needed transportation routes and volume
among its suppliers. Procurement through tendering can be viewed as a three step
process: bid preparation, bid execution, and bid analysis and assignment [4].
The first step in the procurement process is a planning phase – deciding the
specific details of the buyer’s demand, what needs to be tendered, and which suppliers
to contact. When preparing the tender, the shipper first defines the main objective
or goal of the tender. Most commonly the supplier will outsource transportation
services with the goal of reducing costs or increasing revenue. Other common goals
may involve sustainability, consolidating business, reducing lead times, etc. Defining
the buyer’s goals in the beginning will guide the tender and aid in decision making
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throughout the rest of the bid preparation stage.
Once the main objective of the tender is established, the buyer then decides the
specifications of the lots to be bid out. For each lot (i.e., lane) in the tender, the point
of origin, the destination, and the estimated volume on the lane must be specified.
Other properties such as average payload, expected number of annual loads, and the
current cost of servicing that lane may be included to encourage more robust bids
from suppliers. In addition to determining the lanes to be sourced, the buyer must
decide if a lane should be awarded to a single source or if more than one source will
be allowed to service a lane. For example, a firm that has regular shipments from Los
Angeles to Miami must decide if it will bid out the lanes between Los Angeles and
Miami as numerous individual lanes, allow the demand to be divided into a portion
of smaller lanes, or tender the entire set of lanes together to be awarded to a single
supplier. These decisions directly affect the end results of the allocation based on the
suppliers’ reaction to the tender based on the bids received.
Another consideration to address while preparing the tender involves supplier
eligibility: which suppliers will be considered in the tender process.
Supplier eligibility is another consideration the buyer will need to address during
the preparation phase of the tender. Specifically, the buyer determines which suppliers
will be considered in the tender process A buyer may allow any carrier to participate
in the tender through an open market setting or establish a proprietary setting in
which suppliers are put through a qualification process and then chosen to participate
in the tender based on their capabilities [1]. The requirements for a supplier to be
considered for qualification should be clearly outlined and coincide with the buyer’s
17
main objectives of the tender. Only those carriers that aid in achieving the goals of
the buyer should be considered eligible for participation. The basis of the supplier’s
eligibility may include prior business relations, standards such as sustainability efforts,
reputation and/or risk involvement in dealing with the prospective supplier, customer
satisfaction rates, available resources, the ability to meet demand, etc.
Lastly, the tender preparation phase outlines how a supplier should submit their
bids, the decision criteria the shipper uses to evaluate and select winning bids, and
the time frame suppliers have to submit bids. How a supplier submits bids on a lane
is determined by the type of auction used. The traditional auction format allows for
bids to be submitted on each lane independent of all other lanes, while a combinatorial
auction allows carriers to submit bids on packages or sets of lanes. Once all of these
details have been established by the buyer, the next step is to execute the tender. In
this step the tender is formally issued to the potential suppliers. After inviting carriers
to the tender, the buyer awaits responses in the form of bids from the suppliers.
After the launch of the project and all bidding is complete, the buyer evaluates
the bids and gives feedback to the suppliers. The approach a buyer uses to analyze
bids varies depending on (1) the type of auction issued in the tender, (2) the inclusion
of the business constraints and/or preferences, and (3) the buyer’s main objective and
goal(s) of the tender. The buyer determines the final lot allocation after analyzing
the supplier’s data under different scenarios. Finally, the buyer awards its business
to the selected suppliers and informs all participants of the outcome of the tender.
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2.3 Economies of Scope
Transportation providers face economies of scope due to synergies or a dependence
between inbound and outbound travel costs. Carriers typically ship packages on a
lane consisting of an origin and a destination. However, a carrier’s revenue is highly
dependent on the costs incurred from traveling not only to the destination, but also on
the return trip. This creates an interdependence between the two adjacent lanes: the
cost of a delivery from the origin to the destination also depends on either or possibly
both the cost of the return trip to the origin or the cost of traveling to the next pickup
location. For example, a carrier that delivers a product from New York to Chicago
still incurs travel costs on the return trip from Chicago to New York. Economies
of scope are achieved if the carrier can obtain a delivery (or partial delivery) on the
return trip and thus increases its revenue. Factors in the carrier’s network such as
commuting without a load (i.e., deadheading), dead times while loading or unloading,
and variability in lead times all have an additional effect on the cost of a shipment
[4].
Shippers frequently issue a tender in order to outsource the needed transportation
services to the lowest bidder. However, due to the inherently complicated nature of
logistics, the process of sourcing transportation services via an auction introduces
numerous complexities as previously outlined. In a single-lane, noncombinatorial
auction format that awards suppliers based solely on the lowest bid, these complexities
are not taken into account. Hence economies of scope are most likely not going to
be achieved by the carrier in that scenario. Rather than awarding carriers based
solely on lowest cost, the problem of how to assign carriers to the lanes that achieve
19
economies of scope and ultimately minimize cost across the supply chain must be
addressed. Based on the supplier’s transportation network and cost structure, which
is usually unavailable to the buyer during the auction, the buyer is left to solve the
resulting allocation problem consisting of matching those carriers to the demand it
can best handle.
2.4 The Winner Determination Problem
For this research, we focus on 3PL businesses in which B2B outsourcing occurs
through the use of online combinatorial auctions. We are interested in outlining the
process for which companies (referred to as buyers) acquire goods and/or services
through an auction for which suppliers place bids on lanes, commonly referred to as
lots. This method of selecting suppliers is commonly referred to as a tender [2]. In
logistical services, the lot of the tender is comprised of the point of origin and the
destination. For instance, routes from Chicago to Dallas, Paris to New York, or Los
Angeles to Tokyo are examples of domestic and international lanes.
Beginning in the early 1990’s, companies began using auctions in the procure-
ment of transportation services. Sears Logistical Services (SLS) was one of the first
corporations to implement an auction in order to consolidate their logistical services
and reduce costs: in 1993, through the use of a combined-value auction, SLS reduced
its transportation costs from $190 million to $165 million per year on a total of 854
lanes [19]. Other major corporations to carry out the procurement of transportation
through electronic exchanges include Walmart, Home Depot Inc., Kmart Corpora-
tion, Staples Inc., Compaq Computer Company, and The Limited Inc, which claimed
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to have saved $1.24 million in its shipping costs in 2001 by implementing an online
combinatorial auction [6]. However, procurement auctions are not restricted to only
the purchasing of transportation. In the early 2000’s CombineNet hosted over 400
sourcing events for the procurement of a vast number of goods and services, such as
transportation, direct and indirect materials, packaging, chemicals, healthcare, and
telecommunications, and claims savings of $4.4 billion to its customers between 2001
and 2006 [31].
Traditionally, the supplier that provides the “best” bid on a lane or set of lanes
is chosen as the winner for that lot, where the “best” bid is equivalent to the lowest
monetary bid placed on a given lane. However, with the use of online auctions in
conjunction with an increase in the globalization of trade, the lowest bid may not
necessarily result in the “best” or optimal allocation. Choosing the lowest bid on
a given lane may have considerable long-term effects on the buyer’s entire supply
chain, relations between the supplier and buyer, and the supplier’s ability to fulfill
its obligations to its customers. Such characteristics, along with the inclusion of the
buyer’s business rules and preferences, must be taken into account in addition to the
monetary value of each supplier’s bid.
The establishment of the winner determination problem is due to the complexities
that stem from tenders performed on an electronic exchange. The winner determi-
nation problem equates to obtaining an optimal solution on all sets of lanes. This
results in an optimal allocation of total demand among the chosen suppliers [6]. Such
an allocation is considered optimal because, although it may not return the lowest bid
on each individual lane, it will bring additional value to the entire supply chain. The
21
value that an optimal allocation brings may differ on a case by case basis depending
on the buyer’s desired end result, such as minimizing transportation cost, increasing
the number of sustainable carriers, increasing the number of minority owned carriers,
or decreasing the lead time on shipments to its customers. In each of these scenarios,
choosing the lowest bid on each individual lane will most likely not result in achiev-
ing the firm’s main sourcing objective; whereas the buyer is able to achieve its main
objective by obtaining an optimal allocation that takes into account the buyer’s busi-
ness rules and preferences. Thus solving the resulting winner determination problem,
otherwise known as the allocation problem, is the main goal of the tender.
2.5 Allocation Examples
Next we present several examples to illustrate the resulting allocation problem in
order to showcase its complexity. Consider the following scenario: suppose that a
manufacturing company (referred to as the Buyer) needs to purchase freight services
from its main facility in Boston to five regional distribution centers located throughout
the country. The five lanes the buyer needs serviced all have the same origin with
destinations in Los Angeles, Phoenix, Chicago, Jacksonville, and New York City,
designated LA, PHO, CHI, JAX, and NYC, respectively.
The Buyer has implemented an auction for the procurement of its freight services
involving five suppliers: Supplier A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. Table 1 contains
the spreadsheet representation of data the Buyer compiled at the end of the bidding
process. Each row in the table represents one bid, which consist of the lane being bid
on, the bid amount, and the seller that placed the bid. The Buyer then determines
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the winner of each lane based on the lowest bid on a lane-by-lane basis without taking
any constraints or preferences into consideration. Based solely on the lowest bid, the
winning carrier for lane LA is Supplier C at a cost of $100, lane CHI is Supplier A at
$95, lane PHO is Supplier D at $300, lane NYC is Supplier E at $75, and lane JAX
is Supplier A at $180. The cost of transportation services on these five lanes totals
to $750.
Table 1: Allocation main example: suppliers’ bids sorted by lane and lowest bid
amount.
Lane Bid Amount ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C
LA 125 Supplier B
LA 160 Supplier A
LA 210 Supplier D
CHI 95 Supplier A
CHI 125 Supplier C
PHO 300 Supplier D
PHO 375 Supplier B
PHO 510 Supplier A
NYC 75 Supplier E
NYC 85 Supplier D
NYC 90 Supplier B
NYC 120 Supplier A
JAX 180 Supplier A
Next we present several scenarios that introduce specific business rules, con-
straints, and or preferences placed on the auction by the buyer using bids presented
in Table 1, unless otherwise noted.
Scenario 1: Non-price Attributes. In addition to the price of a shipper’s
bid, the buyer wants to take into account one or more non-price attributes, such as
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a supplier’s reputation or preference to an incumbent. The buyer has worked with
supplier A and supplier B in the past and has established good working relationships
with each of them. In light of this, the Buyer would like to continue working with
both of these shippers, so the Buyer decides to award at least one lane to supplier A
and supplier B. Alternatively, the Buyer could have chosen to award a certain % of
lanes, in this case 20%, to its incumbent suppliers.
The traditional method outlined above based exclusively on the lowest bid does not
award any business to supplier B; however, the Buyer could make a quick comparison
and award lane NYC to supplier B instead of supplier E. This results in an increase
in the Buyer’s transportation cost by $15, resulting in a total cost of $765, but the
benefits of working with and continuing to build relationships with its incumbent
suppliers outweighs the price increase in the end. Table 2 indicates the winning bids
for this scenario in bold text, while the bid placed by supplier E that was dropped is
distinguished in italicized text for a convenient comparison between the bids.
Table 2: Inclusion of non-price attributes allocation example: suppliers’ bids in de-
scending order by lane and lowest bid amount.
Lane Bid ($) Placed By Lane Bid ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C PHO 375 Supplier B
LA 125 Supplier B PHO 510 Supplier A
LA 160 Supplier A NYC 75 Supplier E
LA 210 Supplier D NYC 85 Supplier D
CHI 95 Supplier A NYC 90 Supplier B
CHI 125 Supplier C NYC 120 Supplier A
PHO 300 Supplier D JAX 180 Supplier A
Scenario 2: Minimizing Risk. The Buyer may be in a position such that it
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wants to minimize risk and the costs associated with organizing and collaborating with
several suppliers. The Buyer may decide to limit the number of different suppliers it
will award business. Notice that the Buyer’s original allocation allowed it to maintain
contracts with four suppliers: supplier A, C, D, and E. If the Buyer desires to partner
with no more than three carriers, the traditional method of choosing suppliers would
not incorporate this preference. Because of the small number of bids received in the
tender, the Buyer could easily notice that awarding the Los Angeles lane to supplier D
instead of supplier E would fulfill its preference and only increase its transportation
cost by $10. Table 3 presents only the bids that require consideration in order to
reduce the number of suppliers in the allocation from four to three with the winning
bids in bold and the dropped bid in italics. It is important to note that in a tender
consisting of only 14 bids it is not difficult to make this comparison, but doing so
for a tender with hundreds or possibly thousands of bids would not be feasible or
desirable.
Table 3: Minimization of risk allocation example: suppliers’ bids in descending order
by lane and lowest bid amount.
Lane Bid ($) Placed By Lane Bid ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C PHO 375 Supplier B
LA 125 Supplier B NYC 75 Supplier E
PHO 300 Supplier D NYC 85 Supplier D
Scenario 3: Conditional Bids. Conditional bids are often used in a tender
to allow the shipper to partition lanes into a desirable package of lanes for which it
could service at a lower cost than any subset of the individual lanes. These savings are
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passed along to the buyer resulting in lower costs across the supply chain. Conditional
bids are often in the form of XOR statements: conditions on a bid are specified by
the supplier using if, else, or if-else statements [19]. Bids of this form typically allow a
carrier to benefit from economies of scope by taking advantage of other lanes it services
within its network. We present three scenarios that a carrier may take advantage of
conditional bids to reduce it’s cost by placing more competitive bids.
Based on the supplier’s cost structure, a supplier may be able to provide trans-
portation services on a set (or package) of lanes at a lower cost than if each lane was
considered individually. For instance, supplier C could reduce it’s internal costs if
it serviced both lanes to Los Angeles (LA) and Chicago (CHI), perhaps by forming
a closed loop based using other services it provides. If the Buyer allows bidders to
place conditional bids, supplier C could place a more competitive bid such that it
would service LA and CHI for $175 if awarded both lanes. The resulting bid could be
viewed as reducing its bid on CHI by $50 (from $125 to $75) under the condition that
supplier C would be awarded LA and CHI, which would be a win-win scenario since
the Buyer reduces its procurement costs by $20 and supplier C improves its underly-
ing cost structure. Table 4 presents the bids from the current allocation without the
inclusion of conditional bids versus the alternative allocation that takes into account
the use of conditional bids.
Alternatively, a carrier’s limited resources may restrict the total amount of ad-
ditional volume under new contracts it is willing to undertake. However, because
the carrier does not know which lanes it may be awarded, the carrier does not want
to limit the bids it places and risk being awarded less business than desired. Based
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Table 4: Conditional bids scenario: current allocation versus alternative allocation
containing supplier C’s packaged bid set.
Current Allocation Alternative Allocation
Lane Bid ($) Placed By Lane Bid ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C LA 100 Supplier C
LA 125 Supplier B LA 125 Supplier B
CHI 95 Supplier A CHI 95 Supplier A
CHI 125 Supplier C CHI 75 Supplier C
on supplier A’s current volume across its network, it possesses enough resources to
service either the lane to CHI or JAX but not both lanes. Given the current bids
in Table 1, supplier A would be awarded both of these lanes without the ability to
follow through on both contracts, while the use of conditional bids would not lead to
problems associated with this situation such as delayed shipments, negative effects on
the buyer-shipper relationship, and higher transportation costs. In this circumstance
the Buyer would need to award lane CHI to supplier C, resulting in an increase of its
costs by $30 while avoiding the previously outlined difficulties.
Finally, a carrier may wish to be more competitive in its bids by offering a discount
for its services if award a minimum volume. Rather than placing a conditional bid
on specific lanes to take advantage of economies of scope, this tactic allows a carrier
to incorporate economies of scale by increasing its overall production. For instance,
supplier D might offer a discount of 20% if awarded two or more lanes. The Buyer
could easily reduce each of the bids placed by supplier D by 20% and compare the
current bids with this set of new bids presented in Table 5. A quick assessment shows
that the Buyer would not be able to lower its transportation costs using an allocation
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that incorporates supplier D’s conditional bid. In the end, the Buyer would benefit
from its original allocation chosen from Table 1.
Table 5: Conditional bids containing supplier D’s reduced bids (sorted by lane and
lowest bid amount).
Lane Bid Amount ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C
LA 125 Supplier B
LA 160 Supplier A
LA 210 Supplier D
CHI 95 Supplier A
CHI 125 Supplier C
PHO 300 Supplier D
PHO 375 Supplier B
PHO 510 Supplier A
NYC 75 Supplier D
NYC 85 Supplier E
NYC 90 Supplier B
NYC 120 Supplier A
JAX 180 Supplier A
With only five lanes and five suppliers participating in the tender, the Buyer could
manage all of the constraints and conditional bids outlined without much difficulty.
Each alternate allocation could be produced and compared using spreadsheets or ta-
bles and the allocation resulting in the lowest costs that follows the desired constraints
would be chosen. Because of the small number of constraints in our example, it would
not be difficult for the Buyer to determine the optimal allocation; however, in the
worst case scenario the Buyer is at risk of receiving up to (25 − 1) or 31 different
conditional bids [6]. While sorting through all of these bids would not be impossi-
ble, analyzing all of them simultaneously results in an allocation that would be more
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difficult and tedious to obtain.
In light of this, how much more difficult would it be for a company to determine
an allocation for a tender consisting of hundreds of participants and thousands of
bids? A problem of that magnitude would be nearly impossible to solve using only
spreadsheets and tables. Businesses rely heavily on software that is able to handle
and analyze a large number of supplier-lane combinations – possibly an exponential
number of combinations. This further motivates us and leads us to the need for
software which implements operations research in the form of optimization techniques.
One type of software that has these and other capabilities, such as streamlining the
entire tendering process from beginning to end, is the electronic auction.
2.6 Electronic Auctions
Traditionally, the procurement of logistical services involved reverse auctions that
use either a request for quote (RFQ) or request for proposal (RFP) for which the buyer
issues a request for services to potential suppliers, the suppliers submit either quotes
or proposals, respectively, for the desired services, and the carriers are selected based
only on lowest cost [4, 6, 24]. As discussed previously, determining transportation
services based on the cost of an individual lane may not result in the optimal allocation
because of the intertwined cost adjacent lanes have on one another throughout the
network. This interdependence in a carrier’s network is a problem not addressed by
the traditional procurement method of a reverse auction.
Auctions performed using online software implement powerful mathematical op-
timization solvers and algorithms in order to determine the optimal allocation of
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carriers’ bids. In addition to providing optimal solutions to the winner determination
problem, these tools have the ability to include side constraints, business rules, and
buyer preferences into the final allocation [31]. The inclusion of these features puts
both the buyer and shipper at an advantage by utilizing cost saving techniques not
offered through traditional procurement methods.
Obtaining an optimal solution that accounts for business constraints results in
the optimal assignment of carriers to the lanes for which they are able to best serve.
Awarding business to carriers in this fashion has a positive impact on the entire
supply chain. If the buyer reduces the costs of its suppliers, the buyer benefits when
these savings are passed on in the form of lower transportation costs. Pairing carriers
with lanes optimally potentially provides the buyer with other benefits in the form
of increased customer satisfaction, improvements in carrier efficiency, shorter and/or
more reliable lead times, or better relations with its suppliers. These benefits may
further directly or indirectly reduce costs across the supply chain.
Electronic auctions offer many other time and cost saving benefits to both the
supplier and shipper. Honeywell, a United States based technology company with
approximate sales of $39 billion in 2016, claims that the use of electronic sourcing
tools has reduced the time it takes for suppliers to submit bids from up to three
weeks to less than 72 hours [1, 11]. Because the auction is performed through an
online platform, bids are received simultaneously in real-time, allowing for improved
communication and synchronous negotiations with suppliers.
Online platforms offer the extra advantage of being able to better handle the
complexities of combinatorial auctions through sophisticated optimization algorithms.
30
Determining an allocation on a small set of lanes is trivial and may be accomplished
using spreadsheets; however, combinatorial auctions may result in an exponential
number of possible combinations of bids. Such a problem is categorized as NP-
complete: in the worst case scenario the buyer is not able to obtain an exact solution
to the winner determination problem in polynomial time [26]. In these situations an
approximation may be used.
Even though the use of online software in the procurement of logistical service
has numerous benefits, namely monetary savings for the buyer, there are still some
issues to address. In particular, software offered through a third-party provider can
be viewed as a “black box” because of the lack of information regarding the optimizer
and/or algorithms the software uses to obtain its solutions. While some companies
may release older versions of their search algorithms, it is in the best interest of the
company that the ideas and techniques behind their algorithms are kept proprietary.
From the buyer’s perspective, the buyer inputs information regarding the lots, the
suppliers’ corresponding bids, and business constraints. The software outputs the
optimal allocation of lots. One of the key interests in this research is to investigate
how a buyer can be assured an optimal allocation has been determined if little to
nothing is known about the optimization techniques used in determining the given
allocation.
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3 COMBINATORIAL AUCTION OPTIMIZATION MODELS
In the following chapters we formalize the winner determination problem both as a
mixed-integer linear program and as a stochastic linear program. Our goal is to solve
the allocation problem by modeling the combinatorial auction as an optimization
problem. Since we are interested in the auction from the buyer’s perspective, the
goal of the linear program is to assign carriers to lanes in such a fashion that the
collection of accepted bids results in the minimal cost to the buyer. Solving this
optimization problem accomplishes the buyer’s goal of minimizing its total logistical
costs by determining an optimal allocation of suppliers across all lanes. Using this
optimization program, we then incorporate stochastic programming into the model
in order to investigate how the allocation is affected by uncertain changes in future
demand levels.
We proceed by first presenting a brief overview of linear programming in section
3.1, then proceed to present the reverse combinatorial auction (RCA) base optimiza-
tion model, which contains only the most basic constraints that ensure an optimal
allocation. We then build upon the base model in later sections by introducing vari-
ous constraints that the buyer may wish to use in the tender process. Each constraint
represents one or more of the buyer’s business rules. Therefore any number of the
constraints may be simultaneously incorporated into the optimization model to model
different business scenarios.
After establishing the base model in section 3.2.1, we present an example to il-
lustrate its formulation and implementation as a stand alone model in section 3.2.2.
Then we proceed to introduce of a new business rule corresponding to the number of
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distinct carriers in the program and its corresponding constraint(s) as a linear pro-
gram in section 3.3.1. This section is organized such that the carrier constraint model
is presented as an extension of the base model and is followed with an example to
illustrate the development of the model.
3.1 Introduction to Linear Programming
Optimization problems involving the maximization or minimization of a linear
function subject to one or more linear constraints are classified as linear programs
[21]. The linear function that is being either maximized or minimized is referred to as
the objective function, and each of the constraints may be in the form of an equality
or inequality [8]. Given an objective function and a set of constraints, we can write
any linear program in standard form given by
minimize c1x1 + x2x2 + · · ·+ cnxn
subject to ai1x1 + ai2x2 + · · ·+ ainxn ≤ bi, i = 1 . . .m
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, . . . , xn ≥ 0
where the goal of the program is to find values for the variables x1, . . . , xn that
minimize the objective function. Such a solution that minimizes the objective while
satisfying all of the constraints is said to be a feasible solution [16]. Typically this is
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presented in a more compact form using vector notation given by
minimize cTx (1)
subject to Ax ≤ b (2)
x ≥ 0 (3)
where x ∈ Rn is the variable that minimizes the objective function, cT ∈ Rn and
A ∈ Rm×n are the coefficients of the objective and the constraints, respectively,
and b ∈ Rm is the right hand side of the constraint inequality [27]. In a concrete
linear programming model, the values of cT and A will be defined explicitly, and in
an abstract model, the values of the coefficients will be defined implicitly and then
provided by a data set at run time.
Linear programming is used extensively in the field known as operations research,
which can be traced back to the first world war when it was used to improve military
operations [28]. Operations research uses optimization techniques for decision-making
in business and other industries involving highly complex problems. In addition to
linear programming problems that involve a linear objective function and linear con-
straints, mixed-integer programming problems may also be found under the umbrella
of operations research. These types of problems have the additional requirement that
one or more of the variables are restricted to taking on integer values [30].
Numerous real world problems can be modeled as either linear programming prob-
lems or mixed-integer programming problems. Examples of these types of problems
include the assignment or allocation problem of assigning objects to tasks, the max-
imum flow problem of determining which route across a network maximizes flow,
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the minimum spanning tree problem finds the connected sub-tree with the shortest
distance across the network, and the shortest route problem determines the shortest
distance between two nodes within a network [25].
3.2 Reverse Combinatorial Auction: Base Optimization Model
In this research, we have developed a linear program that models the highly com-
plex problem of procurement through outsourcing. Specifically, our work is focused
on business-to-business sourcing events used in transportation procurement from the
perspective of the business that is purchasing the logistical services. While one of our
goals is to develop a linear program that incorporates numerous business rules and
constraints, the base optimization model includes complexities that require the use
of optimization techniques to obtain a feasible solution to the problem. Even with
the inclusion of only the basic business rules and constraints, some of the complexi-
ties the buyer may face could include the large number of suppliers, bids, and lanes,
organizing an extensive national or global network, how the demand across lanes is
spread out over a period of time, and the potential for bids placed on a bundle or
package of lanes [34]. Therefore we first present the base optimization model as a
stand alone model that is able to handle these complexities.
3.2.1 Deterministic RCA Base Model
As is evident from the examples presented in section 2.5, the sourcing event is
modeled as a reverse combinatorial auction from the perspective of the buyer. Since
the buyer desires to procure its needed services at the lowest possible cost, we employ a
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minimization optimization problem in the base model in which the objective function
minimizes the cost of the set of accepted bids, which represent the purchasing of
transportation services from third-party providers. Minimizing the objective function
in this way ensures that any feasible solution of the model will produce the minimal
costs to the buyer subject to the given set of constraints. The overall cost to the
buyer is represented in the objective function as the sum of the winning bids.
Although the base model does not incorporate any business constraints, the linear
program does include constraints to ensure a feasible solution is obtained for the
buyer. A feasible solution must provide a set of winning bids that meet the buyer’s
total demand across all lanes in the network. Moreover, each bid must be accepted in
an all-or-nothing fashion, and each bid cannot be awarded more than one time. For a
given bid, either the entire bundle of items need be assigned to a single carrier or none
of the lots are awarded to the carrier. This ensures that no partial bids are awarded.
All of these considerations will be represented in the linear program as constraints
for which any feasible solution satisfies.
The first and most basic combinatorial auction optimization problem we present
is a linear problem consisting of an objective function and three constraints adapted
from [3, 18]. We let the sets LANES and BIDS represent the set of all items in
the auction and the set of all received bids, respectively. The indexing over these
respective lanes is given by l = 1, . . . ,m, for l ∈ LANES, which represents item l in
the auction, and b = 1, . . . , n, for b ∈ BIDS, which represents bid b out of the set of
all bids. Note that there are a total of m bids and n items. Each bid b ∈ BIDS is
comprised of the set {vb, Sb} where vb represents the bid value or price of bid b and
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Sb is the subset of items contained corresponding to a bundle/package of lanes. We
assume that Sb 6= ∅ ∀ b ∈ BIDS. We represent the total demand over all lanes with
D. If each lane occurs with multiplicity 1 and the total demand is distributed evenly
across all lanes, then D = m [30].
Referring to the procurement example outlined in section 2.5, Table 1 consisting
of five lanes (LA, CHI, PHO, NYC, and JAX) with five bidders A, B, C, D, and
E, and 14 bids; we may denote the lanes and bids using the set notation outlined
above as LANES = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and BIDS = {1, 2, ..., 14}, respectively. Then our
indexing sets are l = 1, . . . , 5 and b = 1, . . . , 14, respectively. We also note that using
this notation we have bid b = 1 is comprised of the set {100, {1}}, where the bid
amount is v1 = 100 and the package of lanes is the singleton set S1 = {1}.
In standard form the program is given by
minimize
n∑
b=1
xbvb (4)
subject to
n∑
b=1
xb|Sb| = D (5)
n∑
b=1
δlbxb = dl ∀ l = 1, . . . ,m (6)
xb ∈ {0, 1}. (7)
The constraint given in Equation (6) refers to an incidence matrix for bids, δ
where the lth row corresponds to the lth item and the bth column, δb, corresponds to
the bth bid. Each element of the matrix δ is defined as
δlb =
{
1 if l ∈ Sb
0 if l /∈ Sb .
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For our example, the incidence matrix for bids, is given by
δ =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

where δ1,1 = 1 represents the first lane, l = 1, being in the bid package of the first bid,
b = 1, and δ2,1 = 0 shows that the second lane, l = 2, is not part of the bid package
for the first bid, b = 1. Summing over each row of the δ matrix produces the total
number of bids placed on the corresponding lane, while summing over each column
gives the total number of lanes in the corresponding bid package. Note that the sum
of each column being equal to one shows that each bid in the program consists of
only a single lane rather than bid packages of more than one lane.
Lastly, the decision variable corresponding the the bth bid is given by xb where
xb =
{
1 if bid b is accepted
0 otherwise
.
All model variables and parameters are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Parameters and variables for the deterministic RCA Base Model
m: Total number of unique lanes in the network
n: Total number of active bids in the tender
l: Indexing parameter over the set of all lanes, l = 1, . . . ,m
b: Indexing parameter over the set of all bids, b = 1, . . . , n
vb: Value of bid b
Sb: Bundle of lanes in bid b
xb: Decision variable for bid b; 1 if bid b is accepted, 0 otherwise
δlb: Variable for lane l; 1 if lane l ∈ Sb, 0 otherwise
D: Total demand across all lanes in the network
dl Total demand on lane l
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3.2.2 Base Model Example
We extend the procurement example presented in section 2.5 to include five new
bid packages that consist of more than one lane to illustrate the Reverse Combinatorial
Auction (RCA) model. Table 7 presents the extended data set consisting of the 19
total bids.
Table 7: Bid packages to illustrate the reverse combinatorial auction base model.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C
LA 125 Supplier B
LA 160 Supplier A
LA 210 Supplier D
CHI 95 Supplier A
CHI 125 Supplier C
PHO 300 Supplier D
PHO 375 Supplier B
PHO 510 Supplier A
NYC 75 Supplier D
NYC 85 Supplier E
NYC 90 Supplier B
NYC 120 Supplier A
JAX 180 Supplier A
LA, JAX 300 Supplier A
LA, CHI, NYC 350 Supplier C
CHI, NYC 190 Supplier D
CHI, PHO, NYC, JAX 690 Supplier E
LA, CHI, PHO 450 Supplier B
The linear program still consists of five lanes (LA, CHI, PHO, NYC, and JAX)
with five bidders A, B, C, D, and E, with a total of 19 bids. Denoting the lanes
and bids using our set notation gives the sets LANES = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and BIDS =
{1, 2, ..., 19}, respectively. Then our indexing sets are l = 1, . . . , 5 and b = 1, . . . , 19,
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respectively. Bids one through 14, as presented in the previous section, are denoted
in the same fashion; bid b = 1 is comprised of the set {100, {1}}, where the bid
amount is v1 = 100 and the package of lanes is the singleton set S1 = {1}. Note that
bid b = 15 consisting of two lanes is denoted by the set {300, {1, 5}}, where the bid
amount is v15 = 300 and the package of lanes is the set S15 = {1, 5} referring to lanes
LA and JAX, respectively.
In this example, the incidence matrix for bids δ, delta, for the 19 bids is given by
δ =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
 .
In contrast to the δ matrix in section 3.2.1, we note that summing over columns 15
through 19 indicates the cardinality of the corresponding bid package, where |S15| = 2,
|S16| = 3, |S17| = 2, |S18| = 4, and |S19| = 3, are all greater than one.
Lastly, the linear program given by
minimize
n∑
b=1
xbvb
subject to
n∑
b=1
xb|Sb| = D
n∑
b=1
δlbxb = dl ∀ l = 1, . . . ,m
xb ∈ {0, 1}
consists of 19 decision variables x = [x1, x2, . . . , x19]. Solving the reverse combina-
torial auction linear program results in each of the decision variables taking on the
binary values of either zero or one, where xi = 1 refers to the acceptance of bid b = i
40
and xi = 0 results in the rejection of bid b = i.
3.2.3 Base Model Example: Implementation and Results
Before proceeding to the formulation and implementation of the carrier constraint
model, we wish to present the results of the example data set when implemented
through computer simulation. While we will discuss the details of the methods and
implementation of the model(s) in chapter 5, the goal of this section is to fully com-
plete the presentation of the example data using the base model here. Moreover, this
will allow us to focus on solely the results of the larger, real world data set provided
by Eastman Chemical Company in chapter 6, thus minimizing any confusion between
the results of the two different data sets.
For implementation of the base model example, the Python file and the corre-
sponding data file were executed using GLPK as the default solver. The computer
code contained in the Python file used in the implementation of the base model ex-
ample data set may be found in Appendix A. We refer the reader to chapter 5 for an
in-depth discussion of the program’s implementation and methods.
The program consisted of one objective, seven constraints, and 20 variables, for
which the objective was minimized. Upon termination, one optimal solution was
found with an objective value of $705 and the resulting decision variable values were
returned as x10 = x14 = x19 = 1 and xi = 0, for i 6= 10, 14, 19. In other words, the
10th, 14th, and 19th bids were accepted with all other bids being rejected. Table 8
represents the information pertaining to the winning bids.
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Table 8: Winning bid packages upon implementation of the base model example via
Pyomo.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
NYC 75 Supplier D
JAX 180 Supplier A
LA, CHI, PHO 450 Supplier B
3.3 Reverse Combinatorial Auction: Carrier Constraints Model
3.3.1 Deterministic Carrier Constraint Model
Using the reverse combinatorial auction base optimization model given in Equa-
tions 4 through 7, we wish to incorporate one or more constraints in order to determine
a minimum and/or a maximum number of different carriers in the final allocation.
We begin by first formulating the carrier constraint for a maximum number of carriers
as follows.
First, we introduce a new indexing set, denoted CARRIERS, which represents
the set of all carriers in the linear program where c = 1, . . . , r indexes over the set and
the total number of participants in the tender is equal to r. Two new parameters,
denoted zc and Mc are also introduced into the base optimization model to track
which carriers are assigned bids and will be in the final allocation. The variable zc
tracks whether each individual carrier c will appear in the final allocation, where
zc =
{
1, if carrier c has at least one accepted bid
0, otherwise
,
and Mc denotes the total number of bids placed by carrier c [3].
For illustrative purposes, suppose carrier r places two bids, i.e., Mc = 2, and let
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x1 and x2 be the corresponding decision variables, respectively. Then if either bid or
both bids from carrier r are accepted, i.e., x1 = 1 and/or x2 = 1, then carrier c has
at least one accepted bid and zr = 1. Alternatively, we can write that if x1 + x2 ≥ 1,
then zc = 1. On the other hand, if both bids are rejected we have that x1 + x2 = 0,
and so zc = 0. This allows us to denote zc for this example as
zc =
{
1, if x1 + x2 ≥ 1
0, otherwise
.
We further note that because zc is binary, we also have the inequality x1 + x2 ≤
Mczc. Recall, zc can only equal 0 if x1 and x2 = 0; therefore, if x1 and x2 = 0, zc = 0
and hence x1 + x2 = 0 ≤Mczc = 0. In the case that only one xi = 1, i = 1 or 2, then
the inequality still holds as zc = 1 in this case, and x1 + x2 = 1 ≤ Mczc = 2(1) = 2.
If both x1 and x2 equal 1, then x1 + x2 = 2 and zc = 1 which implies x1 + x2 = 2 ≤
Mczc = 2.
We can further verify these inequalities by noticing that, without loss of generality,
if x1 + x2 = 1, then the first inequality is satisfied regardless of whether zc = 0 or
zc = 1. However, in this situation the second inequality becomes 1 ≤ Mczc = 2zc,
which implies that zc ≥ 1/2. Therefore zc must be equal to 1. Alternatively, if
x1 + x2 = 0 where both bids are rejected, then this forces zc to be equal to zero [29].
We can generalize this for a carrier c placing Mc = n total bids with corresponding
decision variables x1, x2, . . . , xn, then
zc =
{
1, if x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn ≥ 1
0, otherwise
.
This leads to
zc ≤ x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn ≤Mczc. (8)
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Similar to the base model, we also introduce a new incidence matrix for carriers,
denoted γ, where the cth row, corresponds to the cth carrier and the bth column
corresponds to the bth bid. Each entry in this incidence matrix for lanes is defined as
γcb =
{
1 if carrier c placed bid b
0 otherwise
.
For our example in section 2.5, the incidence matrix for carriers, denoted γ, is
given by
γ =

0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

where γ3,1 = 1 signifies that the third carrier, c = 3, placed the first bid, b =
1, corresponding to row 3, column 1. We note that summing over each row of γ
produces the total number of bids placed by a carrier, i.e.,
∑
b∈BIDS γcb = Mc ∀c ∈
CARRIERS.
This defines a new parameter in the optimization model that serves as a counter
for the total number of carriers in the final allocation. Note that we now assume each
bid is of the form {vb, Sb, cb}, which includes the parameter cb that is used to track
which bids belong to each carrier when setting up the incidence matrix for lanes γ.
When combined with the constraints outlined in the previous section, we obtain
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the following linear program:
minimize
n∑
b=1
xbvb (9)
subject to
n∑
b=1
xb|Sb| = D (10)
n∑
b=1
δlbxb = dl ∀ l = 1, . . . ,m (11)
n∑
b=1
γcbxb −Mczc ≤ 0 ∀ c = 1, . . . , r (12)
zc −
n∑
b=1
γcbxb ≤ 0 ∀ c = 1, . . . , r (13)
r∑
c=1
zc ≥ minCarrier (14)
r∑
c=1
zc ≤ maxCarrier (15)
xb ∈ {0, 1} ∀ b = 1, . . . , n (16)
zc ∈ {0, 1} ∀ c = 1, . . . , r. (17)
The model variables and parameters are summarized in Table 9.
In the carrier constraint model given by Equations (9) – (17), it can be observed
that the constraint given by Equation (10) is the same as in the base model, which
requires the total demand over all lanes to be met by the accepted bids. Likewise
the constraint given by Equation (11) requires the total demand on each lane to be
met by the accepted bids. Constraints given by Equations (12) and (13) use the
inequality established in Equation 8, zc <= x1 + ... + xn <= Mczc for each carrier
c. In other words, for each carrier c, zc must satisfy this constraint if carrier c is
present in a winning bid (indicated by the incidence matrix for lanes, γ). Next we
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Table 9: Parameters and variables for the RCA Model with maximum carrier con-
straints.
m: Total number of unique lanes in the network
n: Total number of active bids in the tender
j: Total number of unique carriers in the tender
l: Indexing parameter over the set of all lanes, l = 1, . . . ,m
b: Indexing parameter over the set of all bids, b = 1, . . . , n
r: Indexing parameter over the set of all carriers, c = 1, . . . , r
vb: Value of bid b
Sb: Bundle of lanes in bid b
cb: Carrier of bid b
xb: Decision variable for bid b; 1 if bid b is accepted, 0 otherwise
zc: Decision variable for carrier c; 1 if carrier r has at least one
Accepted bid, 0 otherwise
δlb: Variable for lane l; 1 if lane l ∈ Sb, 0 otherwise
γcb: Variable for carrier c; 1 if carrier c placed bid b, 0 otherwise
Mc: Total number of bids placed by carrier r
D: Total demand across all lanes in the network
dl: Total demand on lane l
maxCarrier: Maximum number of different carriers
minCarrier: Minimum number of different carriers
let the predetermined maximum number of carriers the buyer wishes to have in the
final allocation be denoted by maxCarrier, and the predetermined minimum number
of carriers be denoted as minCarrier, where Equations (14) and (15) represent the
constraints that requires the maximum and minimum number of carriers to be met by
the total number of different carriers, respectively. Finally, the constraints represented
by Equations (16) and (17) require the decision variables to only take on the values
of either zero or one corresponding to a decision of inclusion for a value of one and
exclusion for a value of zero.
If only one of the two carrier constraints needs to be implemented into the model
46
rather than restricting both the minimum and maximum number of constraints, a
simple modification is necessary. If a buyer requires a minimum number of carriers
but not a maximum, then the buyer would set maxCarrier = a, where a is the total
number of carriers in the program. On the other hand, if a buyer desires a maximum
number of carriers but not a minimum, then let minCarrier = 0.
Thus we have outlined how to incorporate a constraint that allows for a restriction
on the maximum or minimum number of carriers in the program. We proceed by
presenting an example of the Deterministic Maximum Carrier Constraint Model in
the next section.
3.3.2 Carrier Constraint Model Example
We again refer to the extension the procurement example in section 3.2.2 where
the bid packages are given again in Table 10. All of the variable and parameter values
presented in the base model example found in section 3.2.2 have not been changed,
but now we consider the inclusion of the carrier constraints on the linear program,
for which we must consider information regarding the carriers. Our new indexing
set corresponding to the five suppliers A, B, C, D, and E, respectively, is given by
CARRIERS = {1, 2, . . . , 5} with indexing set c = 1, . . . , 5. Additionally, we denote
the total number of bids placed by each carrier as the vector Mc, where we have
Mc = [6, 4, 3, 4, 2]. In this example the incidence matrix γ is given by
γ =

0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

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Table 10: Bid packages used in the RCA Base Model example.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C
LA 125 Supplier B
LA 160 Supplier A
LA 168 Supplier D
CHI 95 Supplier A
CHI 125 Supplier C
PHO 240 Supplier D
PHO 375 Supplier B
PHO 510 Supplier A
NYC 68 Supplier D
NYC 75 Supplier E
NYC 90 Supplier B
NYC 120 Supplier A
JAX 180 Supplier A
LA, JAX 300 Supplier A
LA, CHI, NYC 350 Supplier C
CHI, NYC 190 Supplier D
CHI, PHO, NYC, JAX 690 Supplier E
LA, CHI, PHO 450 Supplier B
where γi,j = 1 if carrier c = i placed bid b = j, and γi,j = 0 if carrier c = i did not
place bid b = j. We can see that the sum of each row equals the corresponding value
of Mc. For example, summing over the first row represents the six bids placed by
carrier c = 1 and corresponds to M1 = 6.
In addition to the decision variable xi in the base model, the carrier constraint
model also contains the decision variable zc where a value of 1 corresponds to carrier c
belonging to the set of carriers with at least one bid in the final allocation. Otherwise
a value of 0 corresponds to carrier c does not have have any accepted bids and will
be appear in the final allocation.
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3.3.3 Carrier Constraint Model Example: Implementation and Results
Next we conclude the presentation of the carrier model example using the data
presented in Table 10 by presenting the several different results of the program for
various restrictions on the maximum and/or minimum number of carriers. We have
included the Pyomo code from Python file in Appendix B for which the reader may
reference.
First we note that formaxCarrier = 3, the program confirms the results presented
in section 8 for which suppliers A, B, and D were chosen to participate in the final
allocation for a total cost of $705. This was established by the optimal solution by
setting the decision variables z1 = z2 = z5 = 1 and z3 = z4 = 0. Hence we may
change the values of the maximum number of carriers and/or minimum number of
carriers to observe changes in the optimal allocation.
Let maxCarrier = 2. Then the resulting linear program consists of one objective,
19 constraints, and 25 decision variables. Upon termination of the program, one
solution was obtained that satisfied all of the constraints and minimized the objective.
The resulting total cost of the allocation was found to be $720 with x12 = x14 = x19 =
1 representing the winning bids and xi = 0 for i 6= 12, 14, 19 representing the losing
bids. Moreover, we have z1 = z2 = 1 for the two carriers that will be in the final
allocation and z3 = z4 = z5 = 0 for those carriers that will not be participating
in the allocation. The information regarding the winning bids is presented in Table
11. We may conclude that for maxCarrier = 2, we have suppliers A and B as the
only carriers, which has caused an increase in the tender cost due to the restriction
imposed by the maximum number of carriers.
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Table 11: Winning bids for the carrier constraint example with maxCarrier = 2.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
NYC 90 Supplier B
JAX 180 Supplier A
LA, CHI, PHO 450 Supplier B
Suppose that we wish to allocate all of the volume to the same carrier by letting
maxCarrier = 1. Then the resulting optimal solution allocates all five lanes to
supplier A for a total cost of $1,025. Our optimization solver provides the solution
given by x5 = x9 = x13 = x15 = 1 and xi 6= 1 for the remaining decision variables
corresponding to the winning and losing bids, and for the carriers, z1 = 1 while
z2 = z3 = z4 = z5 = 0. Hence bids 3, 5, 13, and 15 placed by supplier A allows for
all of the demand to be met by a single carrier. We summarize the winning bids in
Table 12.
Table 12: Winning bids for the carrier constraint example with maxCarrier = 1.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
CHI 95 Supplier A
PHO 510 Supplier A
NYC 120 Supplier A
LA, JAX 300 Supplier A
Note in each of these previous instances, only the maximum carrier constraint is
activated, which is achieved by setting minCarrier = 0.
Next let minCarrier = 4. Here we only want to activate the minimum number
of carriers, so we may set maxCarrier = 5. The optimal solution returns decision
variable values of x1 = x5 = x7 = x10 = x14 = 1 and z1 = z3 = z4 = z5 = 1 with the
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remaining decision variables taking on the value of zero. The total allocation cost
is $760 when four different shippers are issued accepting bids. Table 13 summarizes
this simulation’s results.
Table 13: Winning bids for the carrier constraint example with minCarrier = 4.
Lane(s) Bid Amount ($) Placed By
LA 100 Supplier C
CHI 95 Supplier A
PHO 300 Supplier D
NYC 85 Supplier E
JAX 180 Supplier A
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4 STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING
4.1 Overview of Stochastic Programming
The deterministic model bases its outcomes on data for which the demand values
are estimated. However, in reality a business does not know with certainty that
these predictions will be reliable. When dealing with uncertainty in one or more of
the model parameters, such as demand on individual lanes, an alternate approach is
to develop a stochastic optimization program. Stochastic programming implements
uncertainty in parameter values by using the expected value(s) of the parameter in
the objective function, and then either minimizes or maximizes over the expected
value similarly to the deterministic model [17]. In regards to the implementation of
stochastic programs for the use of transportation procurement, there are two common
approaches: two-stage stochastic programming and simulation via K-scenarios [20].
Transportation procurement models in the form of the winner determination prob-
lem utilize unknown values of future demand levels across all lanes in a network.
Although there is uncertainty in the needed shipment levels, a business must make
decisions regarding which carriers to assign to each lane using an estimated value of
demand. Only after the decision has been made and enforced and after a period of
time has elapsed are the true demand values realized. Issues occur that may be very
costly to the shipper when the actual and estimated demand values greatly differ [12].
Typically two outcomes occur when the estimated demand values do not match
the actual demand. If the actual demand values are less than the predicted values, the
carrier may lose revenue because of the lower volume that needs to be shipped. On
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the other hand, if the actual demand values exceed the predicted value, there may be
an outcome such that the carrier is unable to ship the excess volume, and the shipper
is faced with a new set of decisions regarding how to transport the excess demand,
possibly at a higher cost by outsourcing to another third-party logistics provider [22].
In either case, once the actual volume on each lane is known, the shipper must make
a recourse decision if the true demand differs from the estimated values.
One approach of dealing with uncertainty through stochastic programming is the
two-stage stochastic linear program. In this optimization problem there are two
decision variables referring to each of the two stages: the first set of decisions are
made under uncertainty using the estimated demand values, while the second set of
decisions, often referred to as recourse decisions, are made after the true demand
values are known without the presence of uncertainty [22]. The classical two-stage
stochastic linear program introduces uncertainty into the deterministic model as the
expectation of the cost of the recourse action and is given in [15] by
minimize cTx + ED[min(qTy)]
subject to Ax = b
Tx +Wy ≤ h
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0
where x ∈ Rn is the first-stage decision variable made before the actual demand
values are known, and y ∈ Rm is the second-stage decision variable based on the
parameters, q, T,W,h, and the cost of the recourse action min(qTy), is subject to the
constraint Tx + Wy ≤ h that is activated when the predicted and realized demand
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values differ [32].
We can observe that the objective function of the classical two-stage stochas-
tic linear program is comprised of a deterministic part, cTx, and a stochastic part,
ED[min(qTy)]. In this generalized form, each of these parts represent two different
decisions to be made: which bids to accept/reject and how much volume to allocate
to those carriers with accepted bids. The coefficients of the objective function are
given by cT and qT , while the coefficients of the constraints for which the objective
must satisfy are represented by A, b, T , W , and h. While there is no change in the
definition of the first-stage decision variable, x, which signifies those bids the carrier
should accept corresponding to a forecasted demand value, the introduction of the
second-stage decision variable, y, allows the shipper to determine how much volume
should be assigned to each carrier on a given lane using the actual demand values.
Note that for the type of transportation procurement problem we are interested in for-
mulating, we do not consider the amount of volume to allocate to each carrier, rather
we only assume that the stochastic portion will include the total demand value as the
random variable.
In the transportation procurement problem, we let the random variable in the
stochastic program be the sum of the demand on the individual lanes represented by
the overall demand,
D =
∑
l∈LANES
dl.
Hence the total demand as the random variable Dk is defined as the sum of the
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demand on the individual lanes for the kth variable such that
Dk =
∑
l∈LANES
dlk.
If the shipper views the overall demand as a random variable with some known
probability distribution, then the implementation of the stochastic program can be
performed using a K-scenarios approach. Specifically, if our random variable can take
on a finite number of different values, K, such that
D ∈ {D1, D2, . . . , DK}
with corresponding probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pK , where the probability of the k
th de-
mand value is given by Pr(k) = P (D = Dk) = pk, then the Law of Large Numbers
allows us to assume a uniform distribution with a summation of the average cost of
the recourse action in order to replace the expectation of the cost of the recourse
action with a summation of the average cost of the recourse action [17, 32]. Thus we
have that
ED[min(qTy)] =
K∑
k=1
pkq
Tyk,
where each random demand value Dk corresponds to the decision variable yk for the
kth variable where yk = [y1k, y2k, . . . , ymk], with the objective coefficients q
T given by
the bid values, vT . Essentially this allows us to reduce the two-stage stochastic linear
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program to
minimize cTx +
K∑
k=1
pkq
Tyk
subject to Ax = b
Tx +Wyk ≤ hk k = 1, . . . , K
x ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0
where we utilize the weighted average in the objective function.
Furthermore, we can proceed using the sample average approximation where for
a large enough value of K and if the set of random variables Dk, k = 1, ..., K is
independent and identically distributed across the scenarios, then the probability of
each of our demand values is given by pk = 1/K for each k = 1, . . . , K [17]. We
assume Dk is independent and identically distributed and that k is sufficiently large
so that we may assume a uniform distribution. Hence we may make this substitution
in our objective function to obtain
minimize cTx +
K∑
k=1
1
K
qTyk
subject to Ax = b
Tx +Wyk ≤ hk k = 1, . . . , K
x ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0
for random variable of the continuous type.
Our main concern with creating a stochastic linear program for tending procure-
ment is to not only analyze how changes in the predicted demand values affect the
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overall cost, but specifically consider how variation among those lanes with the great-
est predicted demand values affects cost. We proceed in section 4.2 by formulating a
stochastic linear program of the base model presented in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for a
tendering auction. Much of the focus for the remaining paper will be implementation
of the stochastic linear program base model; however, data containing combinatorial
bids is not included in the implementation of the base model in this paper and is
left as an area of future work. Section 4.3 contains the formulation of the stochastic
carrier constraint model. The methods and implementation of the stochastic base
model can be found in chapter 5.
4.2 Stochastic Linear Program: Base Model
Based on the deterministic linear program presented in section 3.2.1, we wish to
introduce a way to model uncertainty in the estimated demand values. According
to the methods previously outlined, we achieve this through the optimization of the
expected value of demand in the form of a summation using a K-scenarios approach
and the sample average approximation. Our assumptions under this model are that
our choice of K is sufficiently large, we have a known probability distribution for
the random variable representing the demand on a lane, dl, and the set of random
variables for total demand, Dk, is independent and identically distributed across all
scenarios.
For the stochastic linear program, if we have that the coefficients of the objective
function, cT and qT , are assigned to be c = [0, 0, . . . , 0] and
q = v = [v1, v2, . . . , vn] ,
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respectively, and if the coefficients for the constraints are given by the matrices T and
W such that T is defined to the zero matrix and
W =
[
1
T
δ
]
=

1 1 . . . 1
δ11 δ12 . . . δ1n
...
...
. . .
...
δm1 δm2 . . . δmn

where 1 is the ones vector and δ is the incidence matrix for lanes. Moreover, hk is a
vector of the right hand side of the constraints such that
hk =
[
Dk
dk
]
=

Dk
d1k
d2k
...
dmk

where hk will vary with the set of random variables, Dk. Then we have the following
base model of the stochastic linear program given as
minimize
K∑
k=1
n∑
b=1
(
ybkvb/K
)
subject to
n∑
b=1
ybk = DK ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
n∑
b=1
δlbybk = dlk ∀ l = 1, . . . ,m, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
ybk ∈ {0, 1}
where K is the total number of scenarios, or samples of the random variable for the
set of demand values Dk, in the program, and the decision variable is yk.
We now include double indexed variables and parameters to represent values cor-
responding to one sample (i.e., scenario) of the random variable. The parameter for
the demand on each lane, dlk, is not only indexed by the corresponding lane, l, but
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it is also associated with a specific scenario as shown by the index k. Moreover, our
decision variable given by ybk represents the decision to either reject or accept bid b
for scenario k, where the random demand value of the lane corresponding to bid b may
cause a bid to be accepted in some scenarios and rejected in others, thus changing the
outcome of the linear program. The overall demand value, given by Dk, which is the
sum of the individual demand across all lanes, will also vary as the demand values on
each lane are sampled. The remaining parameters are left unchanged as their values
will not differ from one sample of the random variable to another. A summary of the
definitions of these values can be found in Table 14.
Table 14: Parameters and variables for the stochastic RCA Base Model
m: Total number of unique lanes in the network
n: Total number of active bids in the tender
K: Total number of scenarios obtained by sampling the random variable
l: Indexing parameter over the set of all lanes, l = 1, . . . ,m
b: Indexing parameter over the set of all bids, b = 1, . . . , n
k: Indexing parameter over the set of all scenarios, k = 1, . . . , K
vb: Value of bid b
ybk: Decision variable for bid b and scenario k; 1 if bid b for scenario k is
accepted, 0 otherwise
δlb: Variable for lane l; 1 if lane l ∈ Sb, 0 otherwise
Dk: Total demand for scenario k across all lanes in the network
dlk Total demand on lane l for scenario k
4.3 Stochastic Linear Program: Carrier Constraint Model
We next present an extension of the base model of the stochastic linear program
to include constraints for the maximum and/or minimum number of different carriers
to appear in the program. Similarly to the methods used to include the constraints in
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the deterministic model by building on the base model, we introduce a second decision
variable that will be doubly indexed according to the corresponding carrier, c, and
the corresponding scenario, k such that both of the decision variables will depend on
a sample of the random variable. All of the assumptions used in the base stochastic
linear program also apply to the carrier constraint stochastic linear program.
The stochastic carrier constraint model is given by
minimize
K∑
k=1
n∑
b=1
(
ybkvb/K
)
subject to
n∑
b=1
ybk = DK ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
n∑
b=1
δlbybk = dlk ∀ l = 1, . . . ,m, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
n∑
b=1
γcbybk −Mczck ≤ 0 ∀ c = 1, . . . , j, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
zck −
n∑
b=1
γcbybk ≤ 0 ∀ c = 1, . . . , j, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
j∑
c=1
zck ≥ minCarrier ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
j∑
c=1
zck ≤ maxCarrier ∀ k = 1, . . . , K
ybk ∈ {0, 1}
zck ∈ {0, 1}
where K is again the total number of scenarios in the program. Similar to the deter-
ministic carrier constraint model, we introduce the decision variable zck corresponding
to carrier c for scenario k, which will appear in the final allocation for a value of 1 as
determined by the optimal solution of the program. The formulation of the remain-
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ing constraints and parameters does not change from the deterministic model found
in section 3.3.1. The variable and parameter definitions for the stochastic carrier
constraint model can be found in Table 15.
Table 15: Parameters and variables for the stochastic RCA Carrier Constraint Model
m: Total number of unique lanes in the network
n: Total number of active bids in the tender
j: Total number of unique carriers in the tender
K: Total number of scenarios obtained by sampling the random variable
l: Indexing parameter over the set of all lanes, l = 1, . . . ,m
b: Indexing parameter over the set of all bids, b = 1, . . . , n
r: Indexing parameter over the set of all carriers, c = 1, . . . , r
k: Indexing parameter over the set of all scenarios, k = 1, . . . , K
vb: Value of bid b
cb: Carrier of bid b
ybk: Decision variable for bid b and scenario k; 1 if bid b for scenario k is
accepted, 0 otherwise
zck: Decision variable for carrier c and scenario k; 1 if carrier c
has at least one accepted bid, 0 otherwise
δlb: Variable for lane l; 1 if lane l ∈ Sb, 0 otherwise
γcb: Variable for carrier c; 1 if carrier c placed bid b, 0 otherwise
Mc: Total number of bids placed by carrier c
Dk: Total demand for scenario k across all lanes in the network
dlk Total demand on lane l for scenario k
maxCarrier: Maximum number of different carriers
minCarrier: Minimum number of different carriers
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5 METHODS AND IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Software and Packages
In this chapter we discuss the methods used to implement the models and discuss
in detail how to solve reverse combinatorial auction for a set of data. Implementation
of the deterministic and stochastic models was completed in the cloud through the
collaborative software system CoCalc by SageMath Incorporated [14]. Optimization
techniques primarily used the Anaconda Python 3 distribution and relied heavily on
Pyomo: Python Optimization Modeling Objects, which is designed specifically for
the use of modeling and analyzing complex optimization problems through the use of
its built-in modeling objects and solvers [9].
Python was chosen as the main programming language not only because of its
object-oriented abilities, but also because of the extensive number of libraries and
software packages that are readily available through its open-source nature. Fur-
thermore, because Pyomo supports the object-oriented structure and can be used in
conjunction with Python and its myriad of packages and libraries, the entire modeling
process was completed seamlessly within a single Jupyter notebook. In addition to
the capabilities brought by the Pyomo software package, the usage of Python’s data
analysis library pandas allowed for straightforward methods to upload data used to
instantiate the optimization model’s sets and parameters by employing the library’s
built-in data structures [23]. Additionally, NumPy and SciPy packages were utilized
for there scientific computing capabilities on the resulting optimization solution data.
Lastly, the Matplotlib plotting library allowed for the use of high quality visualization
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and plotting tools.
We proceed to discuss the format of the data used and then outline the general
steps of the computational modeling process. Note that slight modifications of the
process are required depending on the model and the modeler’s preferences, such as
in regards to the input data format, inclusion of certain constraints, desired output
format, data analysis, etc. The data used for this research was presented within an
excel spreadsheet consisting of three worksheets for the lots, bids, and vendors data,
respectively. All of the code implemented using a Jupyter notebook for the Eastman
data set can be found in Appendices C and D.
5.2 Data and Preprocessing Steps
Before we proceed to the computational steps of the modeling process, we first
discuss the characteristics of the data set and the prepocessing steps taken to ensure
the data was in a compatible format. All of the example data provided throughout
the chapter represents data used in a European bulk truck tender. While data was
provided by Eastman Chemical Company for the use of the stochastic programming
optimization model, we will also be referring to example data as all data from Eastman
Chemical Company used in this thesis is confidential. Moreover, the data provided
does not include bid packages, but each bid corresponds to a single lane. Appendix
C contains the code for the deterministic models in section 3.2.1 for which the data
consists of packaged bids; otherwise, it will be assumed that any data discussed or
referred to in this and the following chapters will not consist of packaged bids. The
implementation methods provided here will serve as guidelines for the use of packaged
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bids if the reader so desires.
Excel spreadsheets are used to organize the tender data and consist of three work-
sheets for information regarding the lots (i.e., the lanes), the submitted bids, and
the carriers participating in the tender, where each row of the worksheet represents a
single lane, a single bid, or a single vendor, respectively. Data pertaining to the lanes
includes information on the lane identification number, the proportion of the mini-
mum and maximum number of shares of the total volume to be allocated, the total
volume represented as number of tanks, and the current rate for transport on a lane,
if such information is available to the shipper. Data on the submitted bids include an
identification number for each bid, which consists of the corresponding lane number
and carrier name, the name of the carrier (i.e., the logistics service provider), and
the bid amount for one unit of volume on the corresponding lane. The carrier work-
sheet consists of the shipper’s name, the minimum and maximum number of tanks
to be allocated to the carrier, and if the carrier is considered active, where the active
variable might serve as a constraint to automatically include or exclude a vendor if
desired.
For our computational needs and due to the form of the data set received by our
liason at Eastman Chemical Company, three modifications were applied to the data
set in the preprocessing stage, which we will outline here. Firstly, because the data
set contained duplicates bids that were able to be ignored, we removed all of those
duplicated bids. This was completed manually in the preproccessing stage rather than
in the Jupyter notebook to eliminate the need to execute unnecessary commands each
time the linear program was processed. Next we removed any vendors from the data
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set that did not submit any bids in the tender. This was done because of errors it
was causing in the linear program and had no effect on the final outcomes as those
carriers would not have any bids to consider.
In the final preprocessing stage, we chose to include a dummy or ghost vendor in
the data set with bids on every lane that were much higher than the actual submitted
bids. These bids were created in order to represent those lanes that would not be
chosen as being optimally serviced by a participating vendor in the tender. In this
fashion, the shipper would have information regarding which lanes would not appear
in the allocation so that they would be able to take further action to provide a logisti-
cal provider whether it be through a second tender or through individual negotiations
with suppliers. The creation of a ghost vendor is the most important preprocessing
step because of the implications that would arise if a lane was not allocated to any
of the participating vendors during the initial tender.
5.3 Modeling Process
The start of each project within a Jupyter notebook on the CoCalc server begins
with importing the main libraries previously mentioned, along with the entirety of the
Pyomo module. Next we create an instance of a pyomo model for the implementation
of the linear program. Here we have chosen to define it as a concrete model because,
although the model will be implemented in pyomo in its abstract form, the data is
to uploaded and fed into the model at the time of its creation inside of the Jupyter
notebook.
The data file(s) were uploaded next, and a Pandas DataFrame was created for each
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Figure 1: The first eight rows of the bids DataFrame using an example data set.
worksheet in the excel file. Figure 1 illustrates a snippet of the DataFrame containing
the submitted bids where each row represents a single bid and the columns represent
the corresponding variable values of the bid: the bid’s identification key, the name of
carrier that placed the bid, the lane number, and the rate per unit volume at which
the carrier is willing to service the lane. Note that the example data set is more
generic than data provided for an actual tender; here the logistics service providers
are simply numbered one through eight rather than given more realistic names.
Next a DataFrame was built for the program’s parameter(s) δ and γ (only if
the carrier constraint was being included in the linear program). Each of these
DataFrames were then used to create dictionaries of the δ and γ values, respectively,
which were then used to initialize the corresponding pyomo model parameters that
were to be used in buidling the optimization program. Recall that the δ parameter
gives information regarding which lanes are in a bid package to the linear program,
while γ gives information regarding which carriers placed which bids. Both of these
parameters were used in defining the constraints of the linear program.
In a similar fashion, the DataFrames containing the bids and the lanes were used to
construct dictionaries of the bid values and the total volume on each lane, respectively.
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Each of these dictionaries were then used to initialize two pyomo model parameters
where the bidValue parameter contains the value of each bid and the demand param-
eter contains the total volume on each lane. Since each of these parameters is defined
as a vector in the theoretical model, the size of each of the parameters was defined by
a set object in pyomo where the size of each set is determined by the corresponding
DataFrame’s index values.
Additional parameters, such as the total demand, which is represented here as the
total number of lanes in the program, and the maximum and/or minimum number
of carriers, were defined as would be required for the program’s constraints. If the
carrier constraints were to be included in the linear program, an array containing
the total number of bids placed by a each carrier, represented by M in the carrier
constraint model, also had to be created. This array was then used to initialize the
pyomo model parameter.
Here we can see the overall trend or steps needed thus far in developing the
computational model(s) in pyomo out of the abstract model(s) presented previously.
For each parameter in the abstract model, we first define the parameter in python
using a suitable data structure, either an array for those parameters that are single
indexed or a dictionary for the double indexed parameters. These python objects
are then used to initialize the pyomo model object that represents the theoretical
parameter. These parameters will then be used to build the objective function and
constraints that make up the optimization model.
In addition to defining and initializing each of the parameters as a pyomo model
parameter object, we also define the decision variable(s). The base model includes
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the decision variable, x, for each bid in the program. The carrier constraint model
includes not only the decision variable given by x, but also includes a second decision
variable, z, for each carrier in the program. Unlike the parameter indices, the number
of indices for the decision variables, x and z, may be either single or double indexed
if the deterministic or stochastic model, respectively.
Once all of the parameter and variable model objects are created in pyomo, the
final step in establishing the pyomo model is to define the objective function and all
of the constraints. In pyomo this is achieved by writing a function for each object
that will return the expression given in the linear program. Then the pyomo model
objects are created using the built-in Objective and Constraint functions.
After the entire linear program has been created in pyomo, the model is ran
through one of pyomo’s built-in solvers. For our research, we used the GNU Linear
Programming Kit (GLPK) as the default solver.
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6 RESULTS
We now proceed to present several results of the deterministic and stochastic
models using the data set provided by Eastman Chemical Company. As mentioned
in section 5.2, because the data is confidential, we will not discuss any specifics of the
data. Any references to exact lanes, bids, and/or carriers in the data set will be done
using an alias.
While the majority of the results presented here deal with the inclusion of variation
in the base model through implementation of the stochastic base model, we first briefly
discuss the results of the deterministic base model to use as a basis of comparison
for the stochastic model results. We then present results that include variation on
only the lane with the highest estimated demand value, followed by results that
include variation on the two lanes with the highest demand values. In each of these
two simulations, we will discuss how the total cost changes through the inclusion of
random demand values, the distribution of the random demand values on those lanes
with varying demand, and compare the variation on the allocation’s total cost when
one lane versus two lanes have random demand. Lastly, we do include on result of
the deterministic carrier constraint model, but we leave the implementation of the
stochastic carrier constraint model for an area of possible future work.
6.1 Deterministic Model
For confidentiality reasons, all results presented in the following sections will refer
to the suppliers by an alias name. The original data set contains 234 lanes that must
be allocated among 17 suppliers that placed bids on one or more of the lanes. This
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shippers will be referred to as Supplier 1, Supplier 2, etc. As discussed in section 5.2,
one additional supplier was added to the data set, referred to as a dummy vendor, for
the purpose of ensuring a feasible solution to the linear program would be found. We
now proceed to present the results of the base model and then the carrier constraint
model for the deterministic demand values.
6.1.1 Base Model
Upon obtaining the feasible solution to the deterministic base model linear pro-
gram, the results show that the 234 lanes are optimally allocated among 15 of the 17
suppliers that participated in the tender. We found that the dummy vendor was not
assigned any lanes, which is desirable and favorable for the buyer since this implies
that all of the lanes will be serviced in the initial tender without the need for a second
round of bidding. The total cost of the deterministic base model to service all 234
lanes is $8,241,155.
A summary of the results for each supplier may be found in Table 16, which
contains the total number of lanes assigned to each supplier and the total cost to
service all of the lanes assigned to the respective supplier. Note that the rate on the
individual lanes varies and is left undisclosed. Furthermore, there are two carriers that
do not appear in Table 16, Supplier 12 and Supplier 16, as a result of not procuring
any lanes in the tender process.
70
Table 16: Summary of the results of the winning carriers for the deterministic base
model.
Carrier Lane Count Total Volume Total Rate
Supplier 1 7 109 $177,636
Supplier 2 14 65 $224,290
Supplier 3 48 990 $225,5901
Supplier 4 6 32 $50,387
Supplier 5 23 372 $698,971
Supplier 6 28 251 $617,639
Supplier 7 1 470 $1,681,190
Supplier 8 11 124 $335,531
Supplier 9 14 195 $426,551
Supplier 10 3 51 $140,050
Supplier 11 2 10 $14,325
Supplier 13 16 65 $121,685
Supplier 14 24 340 $552,031
Supplier 15 11 167 $426,549
Supplier 17 26 317 $518,419
6.1.2 Carrier Constraints Model
For the carrier constraint model using the deterministic demand values, our results
consider only the activation of the maximum number of constraints and the change
in the tender’s total cost due to the inclusion of this restriction. It can be observed
from Figure 2 that there is a negative association between the number of carriers in
the final allocation with the tender’s total cost. As the restriction on the maximum
number of carriers is lessened, the cost of the tender decreases.
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Figure 2: Maximum number of carriers versus total allocation cost.
6.2 Stochastic Base Model
For the stochastic base model, our primary goal is to introduce variation first on
those lanes with the highest demand in order to observe how unknown changes in
the demand on those lanes would affect the overall cost of the allocation. We focus
on the lanes with the highest demand, because we expect to be able to attribute the
greatest changes in the total cost to those lanes. Specifically, we are interested in the
lanes with a total demand volume of 200 tanks or more. In the data set provided,
there are only two lanes that have total demand over 200 for which we will refer to
as lane 1 and lane 2, where lane 1 has a total demand of 470 tanks and lane 2 has a
total demand of 345 tanks. Before presenting the results of the stochastic base model
in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, we first wish to discuss how the K values for demand were
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chosen using the triangular distribution.
6.2.1 Stochastic Results Using the Triangular Distribution
Results for the stochastic portion of the models is based on the triangular distri-
bution for choosing the random demand values. A triangular distribution is defined
by three values: a = minimum value, b = maximum value, and c = the mode. A tri-
angular distribution is denoted by Tri(a, b, c) [37]. The probability density function
for the triangular distribution is
f(x) =

2(x−a)
(b−a)(c−a) where a ≤ x ≤ c
2(b−x)
(b−a)(c−a) where c < x ≤ b
which implies that the cumulative density function is given by
F (x) =

(x−a)2
(b−a)(c−a) where a ≤ x ≤ c
(b−x)2
(b−a)(c−a) where c < x ≤ b
.
The mean of a triangular distribution in terms of its parameters is given by
a+ b+ c
3
.
represents the mean of the triangular distribution [37]. Implementation of the tri-
angular distribution is achieved using the distribution’s built-in function available
through Python’s NumPy library. We refer the reader to Appendix D for the code
used in the implementation of the stochastic portion of the work.
For the stochastic model, we focus on randomizing only a subset of the lanes at a
time. We begin by randomizing the demand on the lane with the highest estimated
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demand value first. After obtaining the results for the scenarios involving only a
single lane having random demand, we proceed to also randomize the demand on the
lane with the next highest estimated demand value. Proceeding in this manner, by
increasing the number of lanes with stochastic demand one at a time, we desire to
observe the behavior of the tender’s total cost, along with changes in the variation of
the cost across all simulations.
Results for each simulation are achieved as follows. We first choose the lane(s)
that will have random demand values as explained previously and designate the total
number of K-scenarios. Once the lane(s) are chosen to randomize, we fix the de-
mand values for the K-scenarios on the remaining lanes using the lane’s respective
deterministic demand value. On the lanes that have been chosen to have random
demand values, a new demand value is obtained from the triangular distribution for
each K-scenario using the lane’s estimated demand value as the mode. The minimum
and maximum parameters for the triangular distribution are obtained by varying the
mode by a predetermined percentage that depends on the lane’s estimated demand.
For the lanes with more than 20 units volume, we decrease the deterministic
demand by 10% to obtain the triangular distribution’s minimum, and we increase
the deterministic demand by 10% to obtain the triangular distribution’s maximum.
Likewise for lanes having between 5 and 19 units of volume, we decrease the deter-
ministic demand by 5% and increase the deterministic demand by 5% to obtain the
triangular distribution’s minimum and maximum parameter values, respectively. For
lanes with less than 5 units of volume, we decrease the deterministic demand by 1%
and increase the deterministic demand by 1% to obtain the triangular distribution’s
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minimum and maximum parameter values, respectively. For example, if we let µ be
the expected (i.e., deterministic) volume for lane i and assume that the estimated
demand is greater than 20 units of volume, then the triangular distribution used to
obtain the random demand values is defined as Tri(0.9µ, µ, 1.1µ).
6.2.2 Variation on lane 1 only.
We begin by varying the total demand on lane 1 for a total of K = 1000 sim-
ulations. In choosing the 1, 000 demand values for lane 1, we fixed the demand on
every other lane, and drew each random demand value for lane 1 from a triangular
distribution as described in section 6.2.1. The expected demand volume on lane 1
in the Eastman data set is equal to µ = 470 units of volume. Thus the triangular
distribution for lane 1 is given by
Tri(0.9µ, µ, 1.1µ) = Tri(423, 470, 517)
where the minimum volume for lane 1 is 423 units and the maximum is 517 units.
The resulting average cost over all K-scenarios when only lane 1 is varied totals
$8,242,313 as compared to $8,241,155 when no variation is assumed. Additional
summary statistics of the K = 1000 simulations may be found in Table 17. We can
observe that with the introduction of random demand values on lane 1, not only is
there an increase in the mean, but the median total cost is also larger than the total
cost for the deterministic model. However, we find that the resulting increase in the
average cost of the allocation is 0.014%, which is less than a one percent increase
from the deterministic model.
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Table 17: Summary statistics for total cost with variation on one lane only.
Statistic Allocation Cost
Minimum $8,080,190
First quartile $8,198,231
Median $8,244,732
Third quartile $8,288,550
Maximum $8,398,543
Figure 3 shows the histogram of the random demand values for lane 1 with K =
1000 scenarios with an overlay of the triangular distribution’s probability density
function to confirm the random values fit the distribution.
Moreover, Figure 4 shows the histogram of the total cost of each scenario when
variation in the demand value of lane 1 is introduced with K = 1000 scenarios. An
overlay of the triangular distribution’s probability density function is included to
reveal that the total cost also follows the distribution. Note the total cost is in U.S.
dollar amounts.
6.2.3 Variation on lanes 1 and 2.
Next we vary the total demand on lanes 1 and 2 simultaneously for K = 1024
scenarios. The dual variation was found by choosing a perfect square for the value of
K where the square root of K is used for the number of random demand values on
lane 1, i.e., we select
√
1024 = 32 demand values for lane 1. Then for each of those
values, we fix the demand on lane 1 and then vary the demand on lane 2 a total of
32 times. This is repeated for each random value of lane 1, which allows us to find a
total of 1, 024 different combinations (or scenarios) of demand values with both lanes
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Figure 3: Random demand values for one lane with an overlay of the triangular
distribution and K = 1000 total scenarios.
Figure 4: Total cost of each simulation with random demand values for variation on
one lane with an overlay of the triangular distribution and K = 1000 total scenarios.
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1 and 2 having random demand.
Our simulations show that the average cost of the allocation over all K-scenarios
when lanes 1 and 2 are varied in this manner totals $8,238,348 as compared with
an average cost of $8,242,313 when variation is only on lane 1 and a total cost of
$8,241,155 when no variation is assumed. The summary statistics for variation on
both lanes is presented in Table 18, along with the summary statistics for variation
on only lane 1. We can observe that the both the average total cost and the median
total cost have both increased by varying the demand on lane 2 in addition to varying
the demand on lane 1.
Table 18: Summary statistics for the total cost with variation on one lane only com-
pared with variation on two lanes.
Statistic Allocation Cost Lane 1 Allocation Cost Lanes 1 and 2
Minimum $8,080,190 $8,063,386
First quartile $8,198,231 $8,186,220
Median $8,244,732 $8,239,756
Third quartile $8,288,550 $8,290,183
Maximum $8,398,543 $8,422,191
Figure 5 shows the histogram of the total cost of each scenario when variation
in the demand value of lanes 1 and 2 is introduced with K = 1024 scenarios. An
overlay of the triangular distribution’s probability density function is included to
reveal that the total cost also follows the distribution. Note the total cost is in U.S.
dollar amounts.
We also notice that there is an increase in variation in the total cost when two
lanes take on random demand values compared with only one lane. Figure 6 shows
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Figure 5: Total cost of each simulation with random demand values for two lanes
with an overlay of the triangular distribution and K = 1024 total scenarios.
Figure 6: Side by side boxplot of the variation in total cost when only one lane has
random demand versus two having random demand.
the side-by-side boxplots of the distribution of the total cost when only lane 1 has
random demand versus lanes 1 and 2 having random demand values.
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While the median of the two distributions does not differ significantly, we observe
that the Buyer may be faced with a resulting allocation that would have a higher cost
upon the actualized demand values, while on the other hand, the resulting allocation
may have a lower cost upon the actualized demand values. This illuminates the
element of risk involved in using estimated demand values in the tender process. We
expect to see the variation in the total cost continue to increase as the number of
lanes with random demand values increases.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, in this thesis, we developed a mixed-integer constraint model for the
procurement of logistical services through a reverse combinatorial auction. We have
outlined the development of a base model that does not account for additional business
rules in the form of constraints in the mixed-integer linear program. Additionally,
we have developed a linear program that does consider restrictions placed on the
maximum and minimum number of carriers in the program. A deterministic model
has been presented for both the base model and the carrier constraint model that
allows the buyer to use estimated demand values. Additionally, we have shown the
development and use of a stochastic model for which certain lanes have random
demand values drawn from a triangular distribution through stochastic programming
techniques.
Implementation of all of the models we have presented was completed using the
free CoCalc software available online. After completing any preprocessing steps for
the data set to remove duplicates and ensure the data is error free and in a com-
patible format, all of the coding was written in Python for which numerous libraries
were used including NumPy and SciPy, and the linear programming portion of the
computational program was completed in the Python package Pyomo. The Python
and Pyomo code may be located in the appendix.
Upon implementation of the stochastic models using the data set provided by
Eastman Chemical Company, our results indicate that when variation is assumed
on a lane’s demand, the average cost of the tender will increase. We observe that
when compared to the deterministic cost of $8,241,155 for the allocation, an average
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increase of $1,158 occurs when variation for the lane with the highest demand is
introduced. Over 1,000 simulations with random demand on one lane, we observe
the tender’s average total cost to be $8,242,313 as compared to $8,241,155 when no
variation is assume. This upward trend in the allocation’s cost continues when a
second lane’s demand is also randomized. Varying two lanes results in an average
cost of $8,238,348 as compared with $8,242,313 when variation is only on lane 1 and
$8,241,155 when no variation is assumed. Hence the tender’s average cost increases
by $2,807 from the deterministic model. Moreover, we expect that this trend will be
seen as the number of lanes with random demand continues to increase.
While this work outlines the process taken to develop and implement a linear pro-
gram representation of a reverse combinatorial model, there are numerous avenues of
future work to be explored. In particular, increasing the number of lanes with random
demand for the stochastic model to verify the behavior of the tender’s cost would be
the next steps to complete. Additional areas of future work include implementing the
carrier constraint stochastic model, assuming combinations of bids using the Eastman
data, and the implementation of the stochastic model with combination bids. Fur-
thermore, there are numerous business rules that might be considered and combined
with the base model in the form of additional constraints. Lastly, incorporating more
business rules in the more of linear constraints is another area of future work. The
models could include such rules as restricting the number of total units allocated, or
allocating a certain percentage of the total volume, to a given carrier, restricting the
total volume allocated to any carrier, incorporating incentives or priority to certain
carriers, automatically rejecting or including certain carriers from the final allocation,
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limiting the number of different carriers shipping from the same location, and limiting
the number of carriers shipping to the same region.
Transportation procurement benefits from the implementation of optimization
techniques because of the complex aspects involved in determining how to assign
carriers to lanes over large networks. Economies of scope, inter-dependencies across
lanes, and back haul costs must be considered by the shipper when placing bids on
either individual or sets of lanes. The reverse combinatorial auction allows the buyer
to receive more robust and competitive bids that will ultimately reduce costs across
the entire supply chain if the problem of assigning carriers to lanes is completed so
that an optimal outcome will be produced. We have shown one method of achieving
this optimal solution using techniques from operations research through deterministic
and stochastic versions of a mixed-integer linear program.
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APPENDICES
A Base Model Example Code
from pyomo . envi ron import ∗
model = AbstractModel ( )
model . numBids = Param( with in=NonNegat iveIntegers )
model . numItems = Param( with in=NonNegat iveIntegers )
model . BIDS = RangeSet (1 , model . numBids )
model .LANES = RangeSet (1 , model . numItems )
model . bidValue = Param( model . BIDS)
model . demand = Param( model .LANES)
model . d e l t a = Param( model .LANES, model . BIDS , i n i t i a l i z e =0)
model . c a r d i n a l i t y = Param( model . BIDS)
model . x = Var ( model . BIDS , domain = Binary )
de f o b j e x p r e s s i o n ( model ) :
r e turn summation ( model . bidValue , model . x )
model .OBJ = Object ive ( r u l e=ob j exp r e s s i on , s ense=minimize )
de f c o n s t r a i n t r u l e ( model , l ) :
r e turn sum( model . d e l t a [ l , b ]∗model . x [ b ]
f o r b in model . BIDS) <= model . demand [ l ]
model . xConstra int = Constra int ( model .LANES, r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t r u l e )
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de f demand cons t ra in t ru l e ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . x [ b ]∗model . c a r d i n a l i t y [ b ]
f o r b in model . BIDS) >= model . numItems
model . demandConstraint = Constra int ( r u l e=demand cons t ra in t ru l e )
90
B Carrier Constraint Model Example Code
from pyomo . envi ron import ∗
model = AbstractModel ( )
model . numBids = Param( with in=NonNegat iveIntegers )
model . numItems = Param( with in=NonNegat iveIntegers )
model . numCarriers = Param( with in=NonNegat iveIntegers )
model . BIDS = RangeSet (1 , model . numBids )
model .LANES = RangeSet (1 , model . numItems )
model .CARRIERS = RangeSet (1 , model . numCarriers )
model . bidValue = Param( model . BIDS)
model . demand = Param( model .LANES)
model . c a r d i n a l i t y = Param( model . BIDS)
model .M = Param( model .CARRIERS)
model . d e l t a = Param( model .LANES, model . BIDS , i n i t i a l i z e =0)
model . gamma = Param( model .CARRIERS, model . BIDS , i n i t i a l i z e =0)
model . maxCarriers = Param ( )
model . minCarr ie r s = Param ( )
model . x = Var ( model . BIDS , domain = Binary )
model . z = Var ( model .CARRIERS, domain = Binary )
de f o b j e x p r e s s i o n ( model ) :
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r e turn summation ( model . bidValue , model . x )
model .OBJ = Object ive ( r u l e=ob j exp r e s s i on , s ense=minimize )
de f c o n s t r a i n t r u l e ( model , l ) :
r e turn sum( model . d e l t a [ l , b ]∗model . x [ b ] f o r b in model . BIDS)
<= model . demand [ l ]
model . xConstra int = Constra int ( model .LANES, r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t r u l e )
de f demand cons t ra in t ru l e ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . x [ b ]∗model . c a r d i n a l i t y [ b ] f o r b in model . BIDS)
>= model . numItems
model . demandConstraint = Constra int ( r u l e=demand cons t ra in t ru l e )
de f c o n s t r a i n t 2 r u l e ( model , k ) :
r e turn sum( model . gamma[ k , b ]∗model . x [ b ] f o r b in model . BIDS) −
model .M[ k ]∗model . z [ k ] <= 0
model . upperBoundConstraint = Constra int ( model .CARRIERS,
r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t 2 r u l e )
de f c o n s t r a i n t 3 r u l e ( model , k ) :
r e turn model . z [ k ] − sum( model . gamma[ k , b ]∗model . x [ b ] f o r b
in model . BIDS) <= 0
model . lowerBoundConstraint = Constra int ( model .CARRIERS,
r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t 3 r u l e )
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de f c o n s t r a i n t 4 r u l e ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . z [ i ] f o r i in model .CARRIERS) <=
model . maxCarriers
model . zConst ra int = Constra int ( r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t 4 r u l e )
de f c o n s t r a i n t 5 r u l e ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . z [ i ] f o r i in model .CARRIERS) >=
model . minCarr ie r s
model . zConstra int2 = Constra int ( r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t 5 r u l e )
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C Deterministic Portion of the Program Code via Jupyter Notebook
#Import o f main l i b r a r i e s
%matp lo t l i b i n l i n e
from matp lo t l i b import pyplot as p l t
import numpy as np
from f u t u r e import d i v i s i o n , p r i n t f u n c t i o n
from pandas import r e a d e x c e l
from pandas import DataFrame
from pandas import ExcelWriter
from pandas import Exce lF i l e
#Import o f the pyomo module
from pyomo . envi ron import ∗
#Creat ion o f a Concrete Model
model = ConcreteModel ( )
BidsDf = r e a d e x c e l ( ’ TenderDataUpdatedCarriersRemoved . x lsx ’ ,
sheet name=’Bids ’ )
LanesDf = r e a d e x c e l ( ’ TenderDataUpdatedCarriersRemoved . x lsx ’ ,
sheet name=’Lots ’ )
#Create a data from f o r de l t a
de l taDf = DataFrame (np . z e r o s ( ( l en ( LanesDf . index ) ,
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l en ( BidsDf . index ) ) ) )
f o r bid in BidsDf . index :
temp = BidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ]
de l taDf . at [ f l o a t ( temp ) − 1 , bid ] = 1
#Number o f l ane s in the program
model . numItems = len ( LanesDf . index )
## Def ine s e t s
model . BIDS = Set ( i n i t i a l i z e = BidsDf . index . va lue s )
model .LANES = Set ( i n i t i a l i z e = LanesDf . index . va lue s )
# Create a d i c t i o n a r y o f the bid va lue s
bidValues = d i c t ( )
f o r bid in BidsDf . index :
bidValues [ bid ] = BidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ModelRateCUR ’ ] ∗
LanesDf . l o c [ i n t ( BidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ] ) − 1 ,
’ Total Volume (# of tank ) ’ ]
#I n i t i a l i z e bidValue parameter with the value o f each bid
model . bidValue = Param( model . BIDS , i n i t i a l i z e = bidValues ,
doc=’Value o f each bid in the program ’ )
#Create a d i c t i o n a r y o f the t o t a l volume on each lane
demandValues = d i c t ( )
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f o r lane in LanesDf . index :
demandValues [ l ane ] = 1
#I n i t i a l i z e demand parameter with the t o t a l volume on each lane
model . demand = Param( model .LANES, i n i t i a l i z e = demandValues ,
doc=’Total demand on each lane ’ )
#Create a d i c t i o n a r y o f the de l t a va lue s
de l t a = d i c t ( )
f o r lane in LanesDf . index :
f o r bid in BidsDf . index :
d e l t a [ ( lane , bid ) ] = de l taDf . l o c [ lane , bid ]
#I n i t i a l i z e the de l t a parameter
model . d e l t a = Param( model .LANES, model . BIDS , i n i t i a l i z e=de l ta ,
doc=’ de l t a g i v e s in fo rmat ion regard ing which l ane s
are in a bid package ’ )
#Def ine the d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e
model . x = Var ( model . BIDS , domain = Binary , doc=’ Dec i s i on v a r i a b l e
f o r each bid in the program ’ )
#Object ive minimizes the sum of x b ∗ v b over a l l b ids
de f o b j e x p r e s s i o n ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . bidValue [ i ]∗model . x [ i ] f o r i in model . BIDS)
96
model .OBJ = Object ive ( r u l e=ob j exp r e s s i on , s ense=minimize ,
doc=’ Object ive func t i on d e f i n i t i o n ’ )
#Def ine c o n s t r a i n t s
de f demand cons t ra in t ru l e ( model ) :
r e turn sum( model . x [ b ] f o r b in model . BIDS) >= model . numItems
model . demandConstraint = Constra int ( r u l e=demand cons t ra in t ru l e )
de f c o n s t r a i n t r u l e ( model , l ) :
r e turn sum( model . d e l t a [ l , b ]∗model . x [ b ] f o r b in model . BIDS)
>= 1 #model . demand [ l ] = 1 f o r a l l l
model . xConstra int = Constra int ( model .LANES, r u l e=c o n s t r a i n t r u l e )
#Display o f the output in order to r e t r i e v e and use in python
de f pyomo postprocess ( opt ions=None , i n s t ance=None , r e s u l t s=None ) :
model . x . d i sp l ay ( )
#Run the model
from pyomo . opt import So lverFactory
import pyomo . env i ron
opt = SolverFactory (” glpk ”)
r e s u l t s = opt . s o l v e ( model )
#Create a dataframe c o n s i s t i n g o f the winning b ids
winningBids = [ ]
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index = 0
bidNum = 0
f o r p in range ( 2 4 3 3 ) :
i f model . x [ p ] . va lue > 0 :
winningBids . append (bidNum)
bidNum += 1
index += 1
winningBidsDf = BidsDf . i l o c [ winningBids ]
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D Stochastic Portion of the Program Code via Jupyter Notebook
D.1 Single Lane Randomization
#Begin randomizing the demand on the lane with h ighe s t
volume only ( lane 193 in the data f i l e )
#Number s c e n a r i o s
K = 1000
#Create a d i c t i o n a r y o f the t o t a l volume on each lane
and an array o f the random volume f o r lane 193
demandArray = [ ]
demandValues = d i c t ( )
f o r lane in LanesDf . index :
f o r s c e n a r i o in range (0 ,K) :
average = LanesDf . l o c [ lane , ’ Total Volume (# of tank ) ’ ]
i f average >= 400 :
demandValues [ lane , s c e n a r i o ] =
round (np . random . t r i a n g u l a r ( 0 . 9∗ average ,
average , 1 .1∗ average ) , 0 )
demandArray . append ( demandValues [ lane , s c e n a r i o ] )
e l s e :
demandValues [ lane , s c e n a r i o ] = average
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#Create an array o f the t o t a l co s t f o r each k−s c e n a r i o
co s tPerScenar i o = [ ]
co s t = 0
f o r s c e n a r i o in range (0 ,K) :
co s t = 0
f o r bid in winningBidsDf . index :
co s t += winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ModelRateCUR ’ ] ∗
demandValues [ i n t ( winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid ,
‘ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ] ) − 1 , s c e n a r i o ]
co s tPerScenar i o . append ( co s t )
D.2 Two Lane Randomization
#Vary the demand on two l ane s with h i ghe s t volume
#Number s c e n a r i o s
K = 32
#Create a d i c t i o n a r y o f the t o t a l volume on each lane
demandValues2 = d i c t ( )
lane193DemandArray = [ ]
lane63DemandArray = [ ]
f o r lane in LanesDf . index :
f o r s c en a r i o 1 in range (0 ,K) :
100
f o r s c en a r i o 2 in range (0 ,K) :
average = LanesDf . l o c [ lane , ’ Total Volume
(# of tank ) ’ ]
i f average == 470 :
demandValues2 [ lane , s cenar io1 , s c e na r i o2 ] =
round (np . random . t r i a n g u l a r ( 0 . 9∗ average ,
average , 1 .1∗ average ) , 0 )
lane193DemandArray . append ( demandValues2 [ lane ,
s cenar io1 , s c en a r i o 2 ] )
e l i f average == 345 :
demandValues2 [ lane , s cenar io1 , s c e na r i o2 ] =
round (np . random . t r i a n g u l a r ( 0 . 9∗ average ,
average , 1 .1∗ average ) , 0 )
lane63DemandArray . append ( demandValues2 [ lane ,
s cenar io1 , s c en a r i o 2 ] )
e l s e :
demandValues2 [ lane , s cenar io1 , s c e na r i o2 ] =
average
#Create an array o f the t o t a l co s t f o r each k−s c e n a r i o
cos tPerScenar io2 = [ ] #cos t per s c e n a r i o l ane s 193 and 63
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are var i ed
costOnlyVaryLane193 = [ ] #cos t per s c e n a r i o only lane 193
i s var i ed
cos t1 = 0
cos t2 = 0
f o r s c en a r i o 1 in range (0 ,K) :
f o r s c en a r i o 2 in range (0 ,K) :
co s t1 = 0
cos t2 = 0
f o r bid in winningBidsDf . index :
co s t1 += winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid ,
’ModelRateCUR ’ ] ∗ demandValues2 [ i n t (
winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid , ‘ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ] ) − 1 ,
s cenar io1 , s c en a r i o 2 ]
i f i n t ( winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ] ) == 63 :
cos t2 += winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ ModelRateCUR ’ ]∗3 4 5
e l s e :
co s t2 += winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid , ’ ModelRateCUR ’ ] ∗
demandValues2 [ i n t ( winningBidsDf . l o c [ bid ,
‘ LaneID ’ ] [ 4 : ] ) − 1 , s cenar io1 , s c e na r i o2 ]
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cos tPerScenar io2 . append ( cos t1 )
costOnlyVaryLane193 . append ( cos t2 )
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